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Subjection and autonomy are two sides of the politics of ourselves, says Amy Allen (173), yet in 
political theory they are almost always represented as being in tension with one another through 
an on-going academic debate. On one side of this debate are postmodern theorists like Michel 
Foucault and Judith Butler who investigate the self as a heterogeneous concept constituted of pos-
itive power relations, and on the other side are those normative theorists like Jurgen Habermas 
and Seyla Benhabib who argue that the postmodernist approach is incompatible with the notions 
of agency and autonomy mainly because it is limited to an understanding of subjectivity that does 
not allow any possibility for capacity for rational critique (47). For these accounts, personal au-
tonomy means having the freedom to choose what is right for oneself, and it is based on a pre-
supposition of rational accountability.   
Amy Allen’s work is an important contribution to critical theory in the sense that it en-
courages us to get out of the theoretical vicious cycle which forces us to take it for granted that 
postmodernist and normative accounts of subjectivity are mutually exclusive. Instead, this work 
suggests a broader vision to help us better understand and recognise the complex relationship 
and interconnections between the normative and poststructuralist aspects of the politics of the 
self. From this point of view, its main contribution is to ambitiously draw attention to the ways 
within which theorising subjectivity as constitutive of power relations does not necessarily mean 
giving up the normative angle all together, while at the same time recognizing the value of Ha-
bermasian critique.   
Analysing the self as constitutive of power relations in the footsteps of Foucault, and at the 
same time engaging in a productive dialogue with the Habermasian approach, means that one 
has to go back to the roots of the so-called contradiction between these two accounts. Amy Allen 
stresses that a Foucauldian conceptualisation of the subject is not entirely in contradiction with 
Kantian philosophy as Habermasian critiques would argue, rather that Foucault’s theory should 
be understood as a radical transformation of Kant’s idea of the subject (41). From this perspective, 
Foucault does not refuse the idea of subjectification per se; rather by shifting the emphasis to the 
embeddedness of the subject in historical, social and cultural conditions (46), he brings forward a 
critique towards the transcendental-phenomenological subject. This understanding becomes 
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clearer when we look at Foucault’s conception of power as a strategic relation of production; not 
as a substance of repression (49). This means that the individual is always the relay of power, and 
as such individuals play an active role in the maintenance and reproduction of power relations 
(55).  
This point shows that Foucault’s approach is not the reduction of the subject merely to the 
effects of power (47); instead what Foucault suggests is a genealogical account of the ways the 
subject has been constituted – which is not a total rejection of autonomy. From this perspective, 
Foucault’s theory of subjectivity looks beyond the transcendental phenomenological subject by 
not totally refusing it. When it comes to gendered subjectivity for example, Butler’s psychoanalyt-
ic interpretation of Foucault is very important to consider because this perspective helps us better 
understand how individuals become attached to their subordination (174). This is an angle that 
would potentially and inevitably be disregarded by Habermasian theorising because this analysis 
is problematic in recognising the dynamics of power relations in the core domains of the social 
world, for example the socialisation processes within a family (97). This also means that equating 
personal autonomy with rational accountability could mean getting stuck within the confines of 
normativity. Such a Foucauldian conception of the subject is a useful one for uncovering a set of 
historically and socioculturally specific conditions of possibility of subjectivity, agency and au-
tonomy (154). 
Amy Allen argues that Foucault’s work on some level can respond to the critiques that 
claim that his analysis of power undermines any possible conception of subjectivity, agency and 
autonomy. In fact, Foucault does not deny practical reason and autonomy; rather he understands 
them as impure (177). However, this does not mean that Foucault’s theory does not have any lim-
its when it comes to questions of subjectivity and resistance. For example, defining power in 
terms of strategic relations and understanding the exercise of freedom in relation to power in this 
sense makes it difficult to pragmatically analyse how collective social and political movements 
generate the conceptual and normative resources on which individuals draw in their own efforts 
to transform the subjection into liberation (69). At this point it is important to re-address the nor-
mative insights of Habermas. An understanding of autonomy which is intersubjectively devel-
oped through socialisation processes will help us to take up a critical view on the very power re-
lations that are viewed from a Foucauldian angle. As a result, these two accounts cannot be seen 
as mutually exclusive: “recognizing that there is no outside power would help us to be more his-
torically conscious and modest about the status of our normative judgements and principles” 
(182). 
Amy Allen’s in-depth analysis successfully engages the reader with the first-hand read-
ings of these seemingly diverse theoretical perspectives, and brings forward a framework which 
illuminates both sides’ methodological strengths and weaknesses in a systematic way.  In this 
work Amy Allen is able to show that individual choice and resistance can be thought through 
without shying away from either of the theoretical angles. On the contrary: it is possible to under-
stand the self as constituted by power relations as the Foucauldian tradition would suggest, but 
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also accept the autonomous action with an Habermasian interpretation. From this perspective all 
we need to do is to be able to selectively read both accounts. Allen therefore suggests that:  
 
by reading Foucault in a way that emphasizes his connection to the Kantian Enlightenment tradition 
and by interpreting Habermas in a more historicized, contextualist and pragmatic direction it is possible 
to stake out a productive and fertile middle ground between these two theorists whom commentators 
often take to be diametrically opposed (177).  
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